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In re Parental Rights as to M.M.L., 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 21 (May 11, 2017)1
COMPETENCY REQUIREMENTS: TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
Summary
The Court determined that (1) when a parent is deemed incompetent to stand a criminal
trial, there is no statutory authority requiring the district court to continue a parallel parental
rights termination trial so that the parent can regain competence; and (2) when a litigant fails to
object to the State’s method of service in initial pleadings or during trial, the litigant waives all
challenges to the service of a parental rights termination by publication.
Background
In 2014, the State filed a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights regarding
M.M.L. Jr. after numerous concerns over the mother’s mental health. Because the State’s family
division attorneys could not determine the mother’s location, the State attorneys sought and
received permission to serve the mother by publication. The mother’s counsel never objected to
the State’s method of service. After the State filed its termination petition, police arrested the
mother and took her into custody on kidnapping charges. During the mother’s criminal
proceedings, the district court deemed the mother incompetent to stand trial.
When setting a date for her termination trial, and in response to the district court’s
incompetence ruling, the mother’s counsel requested that the court appoint the mother a guardian
ad litem. In September of 2015, the mother’s parental rights trial began and with the mother still
incompetent, the mother’s guardian ad litem was present. The district court granted the State’s
petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights.
Discussion
Nevada law does not require that a parent be deemed competent before a district court may
proceed in a termination of parental rights matter
According to NRS 128.090(2), the district court is not required to wait for a litigant in a
civil action to gain competence prior to trial. In the context of a civil action determining parental
rights, “[t]he continuing needs of a child for proper physical, mental and emotional growth and
development are the decisive considerations in proceedings for termination of parental rights.”2
Because parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care of their children, the court must
preserve a parent’s due process rights in a termination proceeding. In determining whether due
process rights require the continuance of a trial until a parent is deemed competent, courts apply
the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, which balances the parent's interest and the risk of
erroneous deprivation against the government's interest.3
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the mother’s request for a
continuance. First, while the district court did not explicitly reference the Matthews test, the district
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court considered the mother’s interests, the State’s interest in a speedy trial and in protecting the
child’s best interests, and the risk of erroneous deprivation of the mother and State’s interest should
the case continue until the child reached eighteen. Second, because Nevada law allows courts to
consider mental illness when determining parental fault in a termination case, using a parent’s
mental illness as grounds to terminate the parent’s rights, and to indefinitely delay that termination,
would be both logically and legally inconsistent. Third, by appointing the mother a guardian ad
litem, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a continuance.
The district court had personal jurisdiction over the mother despite allegations of insufficient
service because she failed to object below and thus has waived the issue
In a proceeding to terminate parental rights, according to NRS 128.060(2)(a), if the State
knows the parent’s place of residence, then the state must serve the parent with notice of the
hearing. However, if a parent’s place of residence is unknown, then the State must serve notice on
the nearest known relative. If the parent’s location is unknown and due diligence does not reveal
the parent’s location, then the State may petition the court by affidavit for permission to serve the
parent through publication. “Objections to personal jurisdiction, process, or service of process are
waived, however, if not made in a timely motion or not included in a responsive pleading such as
an answer.”4 Here, the mother’s counsel never objected to the issue of service at the district court
level. Thus, without an objection, the mother waived the issue, and the court had personal
jurisdiction over her.
Conclusion
In a parental rights termination trial, the law does not require the district court to grant a
continuance until the challenged parent regains competence. Additionally, here, the district court
considered the due process interests of the mother by appointing a guardian ad litem prior to trial.
Finally, because the mother’s counsel failed to raise the issue of service at the trial level, she
waived the issue on appeal. Thus, the Court affirmed the district court’s order of termination of
parental rights.
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